Th is paper examines the structural changes in East German institutions that occurred in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the years following German Reunifi cation and how they represented a western "takeover" rather than a honest East-West integration. We delve into the long-term impacts of these changes. Finally, we conclude that such West German policies had a detrimental eff ect on eastern Germany today.
I n recent German history, the period marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is known by historians as Die Wende, or "the change. " Th e word "change, " however, is not necessarily imbued with good connotations. While many believe the crowning achievement of Die Wende, one Germany in Europe, to be unequivocally good, some citizens of the former GDR would disagree. Recently, east German politician Matthias Platzeck went so far as to label German reunifi cation not as a "reunifi cation, " but rather as an "Anschluss, " or annexation of East Germany by West Germany. 1 It was certainly controversial and arguably extreme to reference Hitler's annexation of Austria in 1938. However, there is some truth to this statement. In many ways, German Reunification did lead to symbolic "takeovers" of East German institutions, from political to economic, by West German values.
"ARTICLE 23. KEIN ANSCHLUSS UNTER DIESER NUMMER"
Mr. Platzeck's choice of words was hardly a new complaint. In the run-up to the historic 1990 free elections in the GDR, the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS; legal successor of the former ruling communist party, the SED) widely distributed election posters, some with pictures of a telephone, captioned "Article 23, no annexation under this number. " 2 (Th is was meant to be witty wordplay: the German word for annexation, Anschluss, also translates to "telephone connection. ") For the states of the GDR, reunifi cation under Article 23 of West Germany's Basic Law meant immediately adopting the entirety of West Germany's constitution and legal system, abandoning all East German legal theory and precedent. 3 Such a method of reunifi cation was somewhat alarming, especially in light of the more amiable alternative allowed by Article 146 (which would have allowed the reunifi cation process to draft a new, integrated constitution for all of Germany). 4 Fearing the impending takeover that Article 23 represented, the PDS promised, if elected, to block any such attempt.
On a deeper level however, the PDS's campaign slogan also represented a critique of the dynamics of the election itself. Most of the campaigning during the election was done not by East German candidates, but rather by West German interlopers. West German political parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) "sent in all their big guns: Chancellor Kohl, former chancellors Brandt and Schmidt. " 5 Th roughout the GDR, "the complaint went up... that the democratic renewal in the country was being hijacked by the seasoned politicians from the west. " 6 Evidently, political power in the East was to be transferred quickly into hands of west Germans. Th is is confi rmed by the result of these elections, which was a landslide victory for the Alliance for Germany (a coalition led by the CDU calling for speedy reunifi cation). Th e new government promptly implemented the very thing PDS supporters had feared: a process of reunifi cation under Article 23.
West German bureaucrats became, in a sense, permanent occupiers aft er politicians later decided it necessary to keep them in the East. It had been determined that East Germany would depend on outside professional expertise "for a very long time. " West German politicians hoped that by staying in the east, these elite administrators would develop more empathy for the people and local conditions. 8 For East Germans at the time, this unprecedented level of systematic takeover (and simultaneous alienation of the old bureaucrats) was rather uncalled for. Many felt its political expediency to be a slap in the face. As former GDR foreign intelligence chief Markus Wolf dryly notes in his autobiography, "Eastern diplomats [who had negotiated reunifi cation] lost their jobs because they were, in the new jargon, 'systemimmanent, ' while the [very] Western diplomats with whom they had until recently held negotiations moved on up the career ladder. " 9 Simply, everything about east Germany had to be "westernized. " Old GDR document troves such as the Stasi fi les off ered a "reservoir" of legal options for Westerners to disqualify, as well as sometimes criminalize, any of the old elite considered to be "expendable. " 10 Th is was experienced fi rst-hand by Markus Wolf, who found it ironic that he was the one prosecuted when "there had been no judicially relevant diff erence between the activities of the East and West German intelligence services. " 11 With so many Wessies occupying the upper echelons of their government, it is no wonder that "the majority of East Germans feel less and less at home in the Federal Republic in a political sense. " 12 East Germans began increasingly opting out of civic life and processes of political participation. Such alienation, as historian Jürgen Th omanek argues, has over the years threatened democracy in the East. It is a sign that the people do not view the new government as legitimate. Just one month before elections for various administrative positions in 1993, for example, there were no candidates for 300 positions of mayor in the towns and village of Brandenburg. 13 Perhaps one of the greatest scars of east-west inequality from the reunifi cation process can be found in the incorporation of the militaries of the two former German states. Th e GDR's National People's Army (NVA) "had a reputation of being the second best equipped and trained armed force in the communist bloc. " 14 With national fervor from reunifi cation running high, along with an acute need by the West German Bundeswehr for more recruits (it "struggled" to meet its recruiting goals), former NVA soldiers expected to be welcome into the unifi ed Bundeswehr with open arms. 15 However, the opposite was true. Most former NVA offi cers had their ranks "reduced by one or two levels. " 16 All East German soldiers were classifi ed as those who "served in a foreign army" until 2005, and even today are not fully considered "German soldiers. " 17 Th ey have no military funeral honors. 18 One former NVA artillery colonel summed up his frustrations succinctly in an interview: "I feel like a second-class person. " 19 
CHANGES To THE EDUCATIoN SYSTEM
During reunifi cation, a common education commission was established to "supervise the unifi cation of the two education systems. " However, instead of creating unifi ed standards and curricula for both German States, the commission was more concerned with adjusting the eastern education system to western standards. Th e election of the CDU "ensured that the most signifi cant change to the education system would be the importation of federal West German structures. " 20 Experts from the old federal states (West Germany) were appointed to serve at former East German education ministries, while professors from West Germany were nominated heads of newly created or restructured east German university departments. Th is meant power over German academic institutions now lay squarely in the hands of West Germans.
Th e breadth and depth of these transformations suggest, whether good or bad, that reunifi cation was going to entail a full promulgation of West German academic standards rather than just an integration. By 1994, over 13,000 positions at universities in east Germany had been liquidated, and 20,000 more people (including 5,000 professors) had lost their jobs. Many teachers and academics were fi red "despite the fact that they had proven professional qualifi cations. " 21 Th e popular movie Goodbye Lenin! portrays the plight of such academics through the fi ctional Dr. Klappath, a "former principal and highly respected teacher, " who, unemployed, drinks his troubles away. 22 Even positive aspects of East German education, completely separate from communism ideology, such as small class sizes, were changed to fi t West German standards: there was an extensive focus on adjusting "teacher-student proportions to West German standards"(each teacher in East Germany had proportionally less students than in West Germany). 23 Th e Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, Germany (1989) Source: Friedrich Gahlbeck (German Federal Archives) ECoNoMIC PRoBLEMS: "40 YEARS FoR THIS?" Th e most pronounced takeover by the west was perhaps economic. In a scene from Goodbye Lenin!, the protagonist looks for GDR-era Spreewald pickles at his local corner store, which had overnight "turned into a gaudy consumer paradise" in which the consumer "was king. " 24 He, like many others during the period, is unable to fi nd any. Aft er 1990, products in the GDR had been quickly replaced "by western alternatives more attractive to the population, " a development of great detriment to East German consumer industries. 25 Even the old East German currency itself was replaced by its western alternative: the Deutsche Mark. A popular, but economically disastrous, 1:1 monetary exchange rate between the currencies had been instituted, resulting in former East Germany being rendered "completely uncompetitive, " according to the former president of Germany's central Bundesbank Otto von Pöhl. 26 To make things worse, unions in the East strove to close east-west wage diff erentials, leading wages to rise from 30% of western levels to 40% of western levels in just 1990. 27 Such a drastic wage hike only served to intensify the shock of the currency alignment in summer 1990 that precipitated a lengthy recession.
Discussions of economic policy during reunifi cation were oft en incredibly lopsided. Due to the "confusing times" of political transformation in the GDR, eastern industry interest groups were "truly poorly organized" compared to their West German counterparts. As a result, the Treuhandanstalt, an agency which had been tasked with privatizing the former GDR state-owned companies, was given policy directives "that represented Western interests. " 28 Th is meant it oft en sold its interests off at bargain prices. Th e West German insurance company Allianz, for example, was able to "preempt its competitors" when it bought 49 percent of the former state insurance system. Nearly half the state-owned gas monopoly was sold to Ruhrgas AG. 29 Businesses which the Treuhandanstalt could not sell were liquidated.
For most struggling East German businesses, West German ownership was hardly a helping hand. Investors were "oft en less interested in keeping businesses running than neutralizing their remaining potential for competition and getting hold of their customers and real estate. " 30 In other words, taking over a business came fi rst, responsibility for it came second. Oft en this meant factory closings. In one case, the West German steel giant Krupp acquired, with "brazen business acumen, " a competitive steel mill in east Germany. It shut the plant down not long aft er. Th e Treuhandanstalt, as it turns out, had not built the "smallest security" into the sale contract for the plant. "No promise from Krupp was enforceable, " German magazine Der Spiegel reported. 31 Such results led to much anger among East German: in one instance unionized steelworkers rallied outside of the Treuhandanstalt's Berlin offi ce, holding a banner that asked: "How much further will the Treuhand continue this game with our jobs/ workplaces?" 32 At the same time, east German attempts at business creation had unusual "diffi culty in the face of experienced west German competition. " 33 Th e result of this was the loss of "millions of jobs in industry and agriculture" and deindustrialization of seventy percent, a scale which "didn't happen anywhere else in Eastern Europe aft er the Wende. " 34 By comparison, not even post-WWII Germany had seen such decreases in industrial production. 35 East German industry was simply overrun by that of West Germany. Meanwhile, some west Germans "earned themselves silly from unifi cation in this manner: banks and industrialists, insurance companies, realtors, lawyers, and notaries. " 36 Th e eff ects of deindustrialization and economic depression are quite apparent. Unemployment in former East Germany rose steadily from 10.2% in 1991 to a staggering 20.6% in 2005, compared to a mere 4.8% rise in western Germany. 37 Economic indicators were bad across the board. As Markus Wolf comments in his autobiography: "life in a reunifi ed Germany has proven less glamorous than expected-work is oft en diffi cult to fi nd [and] "Former East German political and bureaucratic institutions were usually completely uprooted or radically restructured according to Western models."
to aff ord. " 38 Th e hardships east Germans faced had become so normal that portrayal in German fi lms was not uncommon. In a comical scene from Goodbye Lenin!, the protagonist goes rummaging through dumpsters near his apartment for old Spreewald pickle jars that he can refi ll and pass off to his mother. His neighbor, Herr Ganske, passes by and nonchalantly misinterprets the situation. "So they've driven us to this, " Herr Ganske sadly remarks with little shock, "rooting around in the garbage. " He grouchily responds to the protagonist's request for pickle jars with: "Sorry young man, I'm unemployed myself!" 39 While a fi ctional depiction, it not only shows the economic realities of east Germany post-reunifi cation but also how alienated older former East Germans were by the newly reunifi ed society. Th ey preferred to otherize it with the pronoun "they" (Sie in German) and felt it had taken over all they held dear. In a later scene of Goodbye Lenin!, venting neighbors moan their economic problems in disbelief: "40 years for this?"
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RESTITUTIoN BEFoRE CoMPENSATIoN Some East Germans found no economic respite even in their own homes. For many, the new "Restitution before Compensation" policy could have very well represented literal annexation on a property-by-property basis. Described as a "legislator-organized East-West real estate war" by its opponents, this new policy tried to sort through successive waves of property confi scations that had occurred in the old GDR (sometimes by the GDR state itself) on western legal grounds. 41 One of its results was that a signifi cant number of west Germans who had left the GDR decades ago were able to successfully reclaim their former homes, driving out longtime east German residents in the process. During the 1990s, claims under this policy by west Germans threatened the homes of some fi ve million east Germans. 42 As Der Spiegel reported in 1992, in East Berlin alone there were more than 110,000 restitution applications. 43 Th e results of the policy were appalling. In tiny Berlin suburb Kleinmachnow, 8,000 of the 11,000 residents were forced to leave their homes aft er unifi cation. Nationwide, almost 4 million of East Germany's 17 million population were eventually displaced. 44 Such drastic loss of property (and with it a sense of security) exacerbated economic uncertainties for a number of east Germans.
CoNCLUSIoN
Strictly by defi nition, the reunifi cation process was not an annexation of East Germany by West Germany. No military force was involved, and many in the East are still, with some reservations, quite happy to be part of one unifi ed Germany. However, it is irrefutable that reunifi cation came with signifi cant degrees of westernization in many institutions of the old GDR, whether political, military, academic, economic, or legal. Moreover, it came at a serious cost, whether physical or psychological, to East Germans. Many continue to feel a sense of "second-class citizenship" in their "new" country. 45 While slowly healing, the scars of reunifi cation, or Wiedervereinigung, will certainly continue to persist in German society for decades to come. 3 But, what is that legacy? Under his reign as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Dulles planted stories of successful missions in the press, lied to the presidents he served, and focused much more on protecting the aura surrounding the CIA than gathering true intelligence.
As written in Legacy of Ashes, "Th e myth of a golden age was of the CIA's own making, the product of the publicity and the political propaganda Allen Dulles manufactured in the 1950s. " 4 How, though, did Dulles craft a fl awless, genius image for the CIA? What methods did Dulles use to manipulate the press, the public, and even the other branches of government to bring forth an agency with "a great reputation and a terrible record?" 5 Dulles made the CIA seem like an elite agency full of top agents resulting in high risk, high reward missions-how is this reconciled with the reality of the CIA under Dulles' reign?
INTELLIGENCE IN YoUTH
To begin, it is vital to identify the signifi cance of developing and running an intelligence agency in an open democratic system. 6 Sun Tzu, author of Th e Art of War, insists the best (only) way to fi ght a war is to know the enemy. In fact, "So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle. " 7 Allen W. Dulles did not see it this way, however. To him, intelligence was simply a buzzword used to convince those around him that he was fi ghting the good fi ght. Walter Bedell Smith served as the fourth Director of the CIA, directly preceding Dulles in the position, which worked out in Dulles' favor as Dulles shone in comparison to Bedell Smith's control. He also gained a head start in his conquest for unquestioned power. Th ough Bedell Smith left to become the Under Secretary of State, under his direction "the agency carried out the only two victorious coups in its history. Th e declassifi ed records of those coups show that they succeeded by bribery and coercion and brute force, not secrecy, stealth, and cunning. But they created the legend that the CIA was a silver bullet in the arsenal of democracy. Th ey gave the agency the aura that Dulles coveted. " 8 Dulles leaned on this legacy, and used his power and manipulation within the CIA as the ultimate form of intelligence. His spies were within the agency and his family, he developed a network of people who helped him lie and manipulate the press, the US citizens, and the 10 Th ere were certain standards of education and lifestyle that were acceptable for a Dulles. Th is pattern of success created a culture in which idleness or laziness were not accepted-in fact the family dynamic was "robust to the point of being somewhat spartan. " 11 However spartan it was though, it worked as Allen W. Dulles learned from a young age to use his strengths and leave his weaknesses behind. Born with a clubfoot, Dulles' sister never remembered it as a handicap, rather just a part of his childhood that Dulles never received sympathy for, in "an attempt to toughen the boy to the rigors of life. "
12 Th e Dulles' were never to receive sympathy or seem weak in the eyes of others; instead they were to be the leaders of the community, scholars, moral examples. Allen W. Dulles took this education very seriously; though deemed the "charming rascal of the family, " he was never a slacker, and was successful through childhood, in part due to competition with his brother John Foster Dulles. 13 In everything from school, "the large amount of reading, learning, and reciting they were encouraged to do at home, " to recreational, leisure trips Allen and John were pitted against one another, partially by family, and in part by each other. Family fi shing trips in which Allen would go with "Uncle Bert [Robert Lansing]" and John would ride with "his grandfather [John W. Foster]" took on a severely competitive nature; the boys were not even allowed to speak.
14 Only during the lunch stops was discussion permitted, and then the topics were political concerns and world events-oft en high-ranking government offi cials, foreign and domestic, made these trips and there was no fi lter put on the policy discussions in front of John and Allen. 15 From this young age, the Dulles brothers were taught to debate hotly and hold discussion and power close to the chest.
THE DULLES BRoTHERS IN PoWER
From this lesson came Dulles' knowledge that an alliance with his brother could bring him great success, but the competition with his brother was a fi ne line that had to be maneuvered carefully if he was to ultimately become more successful than John. From being left at home while John went abroad just before he went to Princeton to his entire Princeton experience at John's alma mater, Allen attempted to outshine, or at least equal John's accomplishments. 16 Princeton underwent great changes that resulted in the revelation that "Foster's class had been fi rmly rooted in the nineteenth century. During Allie's four years there, Princeton and the world took a last deep breath and then plunged headlong into the twentieth century. " 17 Th ough, John graduated fi rst in his class, and Allen only ninth, both won prizes for their dissertations, and Allen participated in many more clubs and organizations. 18 Known as a joiner, Allen was a member of the Whig Society, Law Club, the Municipal Club, and Cap and Gown eating club, while John was described as a "'poler, ' a serious studier. " 19 Essentially, every aspect of Allen Dulles' growing up was embittered in competition with his highachieving brother, and pushed by his successful relatives and family. He was only ever taught that power comes from success, success comes from knowledge, and knowledge was to be acquired through studying books… and people. Th e complicated competition and companionship of the two brothers can be seen in their hungry desire to play strategic games at all times, most notably chess. Th is game grew with them through childhood into adulthood; "the Dulles brothers were obsessive chess players… Allen could not be distracted from a lengthy joust with his brother. Th e Dulles brothers would bring the same strategic fi xation to the game of global politics. " Sada O. Stewart racy was an enterprise that had to be carefully managed by the right men, not simply left to elected offi cials as a public trust. " 21 Since they ran "the most powerful corporate law fi rm in the nation, " Sullivan and Cromwell, they relied on the men who made up a privileged elite to override and run the inner workings of politics. 22 Aside from the agreement to work together at Sullivan and Cromwell, it became clear the brothers had entirely diff erent views on how to play the game of politics. Allen had the "colder eye of the two, " developing a foreign policy much more like Lansing's than his grandfathers; that is, "[Th ey] reasoned that if a nation is truly sovereign, then only a greater physical force can change its course; questions of right and wrong were on the margin. " 23 Th ough both Dulles brothers were tough lawyers, and power hungry politicians, it was Allen Dulles that became the shark. John Foster Dulles had the mantra, "'Do not comply, ' … 'Resist the law with all your might, and soon everything will be all right;'" those were words that he would continue to carry on through his career and inspire Allen in his tenure as CIA director. 24 Dulles was power hungry, and had been since his young career start with the government. He quickly made his way through the ranks of politics beginning as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, acting as Director and Secretary. 25 Proving himself in that context, and at Sullivan and Cromwell, he began to make a name for himself as republican and interventionist fi ghting for the election of the party leaders, losing the 1948 election as an advisor to Dewey, but remaining active in the party. 26 His most signifi cant career move came at the beginning of WWII, however, when he took the position as the Swiss direction of the Offi ce of Strategic Services (OSS). 27 It was not long aft er the end of WWII that he was called upon to move into the ranks of the CIA.
And to his ultimate favor, he became Director in 1953, as the fi rst civilian DCI, and just a few years aft er the passage of the CIA Act which "gave the agency the widest conceivable powers. " 28 More importantly, the election of Eisenhower resulted in the brothers becoming "the new heads of the State Department and the CIA" via which they could "direct the global operations of the most powerful nation in the world. " 29 Despite any competition, or perhaps because of it, the Dulles brothers had " a unique leverage over the incoming administration, and they were imbued with a deep sense of confidence that these were the roles they were destined to play. " 30 Essentially, approval for any mission or operation could be requested and approved, or at least infl uenced, by one or both of the brothers. Th ey had an ultimate hand in the politics of the newly created intelligence agency, and on foreign aff airs of the entire United States.
SECRETS AS CURRENCY: DULLES AT THE CIA
For as much power as Dulles had in this new position as DCI, there was nothing he liked more than secrets, and nothing he disliked more than having to consult other people for authority. Reportedly, Dulles was an expert and spinning situations to always remain in control of his words and his secrets. At his dinner parties, when guests (who all numbered in the high-ranking government of Washington) would try to gather insight into the various crises he would tell stories with casts of characters that included former presidents, foreign diplomats, and evil dictators-not at all replying to the question asked of him. 31 Reportedly, without divulging any ounce of covert information to the rest of the party, Dulles managed to leave everyone with "an aft erglow, feeling they had been present at a rare inside look into the workings of high aff airs. " 32 Even in the informal setting of dinner parties, Allen Dulles remained in control, and he never loosened his façade of power, for fear that the image of the CIA would crash down with it. In work and social situations, "' Allen gave the impression of being a gregarious type. He was full of jollity. With his hearty laugh, his tweed coat, and his love of the martini, he cut quite a figure. But he never left any doubt that he was always looking for information rather than giving it out. He was very good at giving you tidbits in order to draw what he wanted from you. '" 33 These secrets and need for power stretched as far as his personal life in which his marriage to Clover was anything but sacred. He had "as his sister, Eleanor, wrote later, 'at least a hundred'" affairs. 34 He often wrote to his wife insinuating these infidelities occurred in the letters, detailing the beauty of the women he was keeping company with (and his mistresses included his wife's best friend, and the Queen of Greece, to name a few). 35 Though ultimately a part of his private life, this need to be desired, and conquer his every whim shows Dulles' true nature as a control-seeking director of intelligence-a man prepared to lie, cheat, and steal in order to keep what he holds close to his chest, and to acquire every tool possible to defend those secrets.
One of the earliest examples of Dulles' disregard for oversight and second opinions came in the form of Operation Ajax, the name given to the plan for the Iranian Coup in 1953. Frank Wisner said once that the "CIA makes policy by default, " and this was one of those times, as the US government publicly supported Mossadegh, the very leader the CIA plotted to overthrow with the help of the British Secret Intelligence Service. 36 The plan relied very heavily, if not exclusively on the fact that the US had money to hand out; by bribing various members of Mossadegh's family and cabinet, the CIA suddenly had influence in Iran. Despite President Eisenhower's pervasive hesitance to approve the mission, Dulles went full steam ahead. A full propaganda scheme underway, money flowing into Iran, and a new shah handpicked to take over after the coup, the plan seemed infallible-except, of course, if one of the many Iranian men on the inside of the plan talked, which is how Mossadegh learned of his own coup. 37 The country quickly flew into chaos, with pro-shah forces seeking out CIA officers and agents, and creating a world of violence in the nation. "Dr. Mossadegh had overreached, playing into the C.I.A. 's hands by dissolving Parliament after the coup, " so he was nearly caught, but instead flew to Rome in August 1953. 38 His departure left the operation headquarters in "depression and despair, " the history states, adding, "The message sent to Tehran on the night of Aug. 18 said that 'the operation has been tried and failed, ' and that 'in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary operations against Mossadegh [sic] should be discontinued. '" 39 Potentially the most amazing part of Operation Ajax is the aftermath in the American media and government, in which Kim Roosevelt (station head of the operation) and Dulles were heralded as heroes. By definition only, the mission seemed to have been fairly successful, if messy-that is, the Mossadegh was out of power. In an interview Dulles engaged in with John Chancellor for the NBC segment "The Science of Spying, " he responds to a question about the details of the Iranian coup by saying "The government of Mossadegh [sic], if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny. " 40 Clearly elusive, and as vague as possible, Dulles maintains the success and prestige of the operation by condescendingly keeping the power in his own hands. It was the action of the Shah that created the fall of power, yet it was the benevolent push of the CIA that created the destruction-but the destruction was not his fault, it was the Iranians.
Some men, Ray Cline being one of them, saw this as simply an "extravagant impression of CIA's power. " Basically, this mission did nothing to actually prove the CIA's might, and definitely did not encourage anyone of the worth of intelligence the CIA was gathering-it seemed, at least to Cline, to be more of a coincidence that the CIA was able to push Iran at just the right time to encourage a revolution, mostly by accident. 41 All the CIA had done was push money into Iran, and trust the wrong people, which resulted in Mossadegh finding out the plan early. However, Dulles saw quite a different story. He instead found "[t]he illusion that the CIA could overthrow a nation by sleight of hand…alluring. " 42 This mission created years of turmoil and SAVAK, the intelligence agency and secret police that ran much like the CIA, with no limitations to power and no oversight, becoming "Iran's most hated and feared institution. " 43 However, Dulles chose to see it as an exertion of his power-he approved a mission to overthrow Mossadegh, and Mossadegh was now in Rome. His concealment expressed pure power and success, he refused to acknowledge that perhaps it was accidental, unnecessary, and in the long run detrimental-all Operation Ajax meant was that he could continue to run his CIA as he pleased, with whatever money he wanted.
In true Dulles style, he continued with his illusion of CIA power and success by perpetuating the myth of success by "Dulles made the CIA seem like an elite agency full of top agents resulting in high risk, high reward missions."
any means possible in the case of the Guatemalan coup in 1954. With the plan in place for the CIA to overthrow the "democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Ár-benz, " the CIA made a list of fi ft y-eight high-ranking government leaders who were to be assassinated, or "'whose removal for psychological, organizational, or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action. '" 44 Th is justifi cation made it clear that the removal of these men in order to replace Árbenz with the "'bold, but incompetent' Castillo Armas" was an act of grace for the Guatemalan people by the CIA, or so Dulles upheld. 45 In fact, the CIA waged psychological warfare on Árbenz and the people of Guatemala by dropping leafl ets on cities inciting terror campaigns against the evils of Árbenz's government, in favor of Armas, perpetuated further by radio campaigns. Árbenz played right into the CIA's hands by fearing rebellion and taking away many civil liberties that had been granted by his administrationbecoming "the dictator the CIA depicted. " 46 And as Castillo Armas attacked and eventually took over for Árbenz's reign, he banned the party system, tortured people, and upended nearly all of the reforms that had taken place during the Guatemalan Revolution. 47 To this end, the Operation Success was anything but-however, Dulles once again used his powers of deception to paint a pretty picture for the media. "One of the many myths about Operation Success, planted by Allen Dulles in the American Press, was that its eventual triumph lay not in violence but in a brilliant piece of espionage"-once more Dulles enacted his total control of the media and to some extent the US government (as he and John Foster Dulles 'encouraged' Eisenhower to take the steps to enact Operation Success). " 48 A mere ten years later, Dulles proved his dedication to absolving himself and the CIA of any wrongdoing, preserving the veneer of polish, by saying on air, "Well, only as far as I know we don't engage in assassinations and kidnapping, things of that kind. As far as I know we never have. " 49 Dulles' aptitude for lying not only encouraged his own power hungry agenda, but also promoted the win at all cost attitude in his colleagues as well. Richard Bissell was chief of clandestine services in the late 1950s, and during the period in which the US engaged in U2 fl yovers of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the president was to order the missions, "Bissell ran the program, and he was petulant about fi ling his fl ight plans. He tried to evade presidential authority by secretly seeking to outsource fl ights to the British and the Chinese Nationalists. "50 Over the course of the four years the U2 fl ights took place, many planes fl ew over the Soviets in an attempt to track the nuclear arms in their arsenal; in the process, however, the Soviets had begun to detect the fl ights going on. 51 With Bissell carelessly demanding another fl ight, and the Soviets tracking the US movement, it seemed to be a recipe for disaster as Gary Francis Powers took of from Pakistan for what was to be the last fl ight of the operation. 52 When Powers fl ew over Russian airspace, a missile struck his plane, causing him to have to eject and be captured alive by the Soviets. 53 When word came to the CIA that the plane had crashed, it became the job of Dulles to attempt to clean up the mess caused by the secret missions-to even his surprise, NASA came out with the story that a weather plane had gone down in Turkey. Dulles and the CIA ran with this lie to the American public, all in the name of preserving the image of success for the CIA, even when it was his policy that made lying and causing this disaster possible. Th e government and the CIA even went as far as to say "'Th ere was no authorization for such a fl ight. '" 54 However, as is typically the case, this caused more problems than it solved as this statement made it seem like President Eisenhower, who had been strategically and circularly informed about these fl ights, had no control over the CIA.
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Th erefore, he had to come clean, and "For the fi rst time in the history of the United States, millions of citizens understood that their president could deceive them in the name of national security. "
56 Dulles' reign of lies had spread like wildfi re through the agency, and at this point the CIA had already been heralded as a life saving organization, full of men who understood international aff airs to a degree above everyone else. It was disasters like this US incident, and the aft ermath that Dulles perpetuated by covering lies and allowing himself and other men to run their operations on their own terms, outside of presidential oversight. However, even Eisenhower was convinced by the lies of Dulles, as in the time immediately aft er his departure from offi ce he sent Dulles a letter saying, "As I think you know, I wish you and your associates in the Central Intelligence Agency well in the tremendously important job you do for our country"-showing his clear forgiving of the power of the agency. Dulles responds with, "Th ese have been formative years for this Agency. 57 You have given us constant encouragement and support in the collection and coordination of intelligence for national security decisions. " 58 Clearly, once again, Dulles tells even the president what he wants to hear-and in the process shows his ability to control many facets of government. 
oMISSIoN oF TRUTH, oR LIES?
In an eff ort to make Americans forget about the dismal nature of the previous months' failures, the CIA used the summer months of 1960 to focus on, and throw more resources at the "hot spots in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia. " 59 However, one of the most central missions of the CIA was the assassination attempts of Fidel Castro, for which the CIA secured "another $10.75 million to begin paramilitary training of the fi ve hundred Cubans in Guatemala… on one condition: 'So long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we have a good chance of being successful. '" 60 To Dulles, the phrase 'good chance' was more than enough for him to approve the missions and tell the president the CIA would take the money and do the job. Th is ignorance to the facts, or perhaps the blinding desire for power and control, ultimately led to the Bay of Pigs invasion, also the downfall of Dulles' career.
Th e operation called for 1400 men to be part of the paramilitary troops that were to take out Castro's army and render him defenseless. 61 However, the "CIA had used obsolete World War II B-26 bombers, and painted them to look like Cuban air force planes. Th e bombers missed many of their targets and left most of Castro's air force intact. As news broke of the attack, photos of the repainted U.S. planes became public and revealed American support for the invasion. "
62 Despite this, however, Dulles seemed unperturbed, answering to the news of failed operations with "an oddly bemused look, as if the unfolding tragedy was too remote to aff ect him. " 63 His behavior strange, and his unexplained absence from the offi ce that day serve only to perpetuate the idea that he acted in a manner to usurp power, and deny negative press. He could not be at fault for the failure of the operation if he, and his best men, were not present. In fact, "Kennedy was to blame by blocking the agency's last-minute requests for air strikes. " 64 Dulles knew that more troops would be necessary, but Kennedy would end up taking the fall-Dulles was banking on a full-scale invasion of Cuba, and thought his incomplete plan would force the issue. 65 In this case, Kennedy "took full blame for the Cuba fi asco, " again leaving the CIA with a reputation of at least quasi-heroism, though this time, it left Dulles without a job. Near constant bickering and mutual dislike and distrust between Kennedy and Dulles-a power struggle of dramatic proportions-caused Kennedy to declare that he wanted to "splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it into the winds. " 66 For the fi rst time, Dulles had to abandon his practice of "denying everything, admitting nothing, [and hiding] the truth to conceal the failures of his covert operations. " 67 Allen Dulles retired as director of central intelligence in 1961; his legacy present in the building of the headquarters of the CIA, as well as in the somehow unmarred record of the CIA under his leadership, in an era when "'Th e record in Europe was bad, ' …'Th e record in Asia was bad. Th e agency had a terrible record in its early days-a great reputation and a terrible record. '" 68 
THE ART oF MANIPULATIoN: ALLEN DULLES IN PoWER
Allen Dulles, with the initial help of his brother, was a master in the art of the manipulation of information. Together, they were able to control arguably the most powerful agency of the government in the 1950s by lying and gathering (or making up) intelligence, and acting on that information with the strength of the United States government behind them. Beyond the control of the government, Dulles relied on the control of the media to help him maintain the support of the public to keep his painted image of the CIA unharmed. Dulles became in charge of Operation Mockingbird-he was able to hire journalists to report the stories the CIA wanted to have reported, the way they wanted to have them reported. Th ough it must be noted, that journalism houses oft en operated with the knowledge of the owner that this recruiting was happening. 69 Th ough there was both domestic and international involvement, the most common form of communication was a mutual relationship between the journalists and the CIA-it was not necessarily an infi ltration by the CIA, but it certainly swayed the American public to hear the version of history the CIA wanted to tell. In most cases it worked as follows:
In most instances, Agency fi les show, offi cials at the highest levels of the CIA usually director or deputy director) dealt personally with a single designated individual in the top management of the cooperating news organization. Th e aid furnished oft en took two forms: providing jobs and credentials "journalistic cover" in Agency parlance) for CIA operatives about to be posted in foreign capitals; and lending the Agency the undercover services of reporters already on staff , including some of the best-known correspondents in the business. 70 Even now, looking at the media coverage, and especially the CIA versions of Dulles' history paint him as a hero. Dulles led the CIA "when the public viewed the CIA as a patriotic organization of people fi ghting our Cold War enemies" and during the "hey-day of successful espionage against the Communist Bloc. Dulles presided over the Agency during one of its most active and interesting periods. Dulles was an expert at using power in his favor to blind others to incompetence and failures; by utilizing this skill, in conjunction with his complicated relationship with his brother, he was able to create a regime at the CIA that disregarded moral intelligence seeking for a gilded idea of success and power. He cared little for the approval of his higher-ups, though there were few, and he regarded himself as the man most suited to make decisions for the CIA. His childhood led him to live a charmed life-he was able to combine strength of character with precociousness in a way that his family and their dignifi ed friends approved of. Dulles was intelligent, charming, attractive, and used his desire to beat his brother to make it to the top of his class at Princeton, and then to the top of the political world. From playing chess to orchestrating assassinations that were never admitted to the public, Dulles took on the role of the most powerful man in America. He had power of decision and deception that escaped even the presidents he served under. Dulles manipulated the fl awless image of the CIA that stands today by using the skills he learned as a child, retaining his 'cold eye, ' and out manipulating everyone in the government to truth believe the verse that still stands engraved in the lobby of the CIA headquarters: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. " 72 Dulles knew no truths aside from the ones he fabricated himself, and knew no enemy aside from the ones he craft ed in his own war on the world. Dulles did not use intelligence to fi ght for the preservation of democracy and America-rather, he fashioned intelligence to be able to play the political mastermind he always desired to be. Dulles created the legend that became fact-the CIA was infallible because "intelligence is information and information is power" and he and his agency controlled all of the intelligence in the country, at least on paper. In many ways, Dulles created the CIA, and in the process developed the most Noble Lie in the history of America-that our nation can have an open democratic system with a secret intelligence-gathering agency. Together, the projects of William T. Stead, Hull House, and the Chicago School of Sociology constituted a genealogy of early thematic mapping in Chicago. Such maps had their roots in an immense cartographic shift that occurred in the nineteenth-century United States, as American thinkers pushed cartography past the mere description of a landscape and toward the revelation of patterns in spatial relationships. In response to rapid urbanization, the Sanborn Map Company began in 1866 to produce new insurance maps that catalogued cities in great detail. This development, as well as the genre of urban disease maps, as established by projects such as John Snow's 1854 map of the London cholera outbreak and Charles Booth's 1885-1903 maps of poverty in London, were the precursors of the cartographically informed urban reform projects that appeared in turn-of-the-century Chicago.
Each set of reformers differed in its ideology and its impetus to map. However, the premises of all three rested on the notion of the industrializing city as an intrinsically disordered space. Drawing from the premises of earlier insurance and disease maps, these programs all employed cartographic methods in order to analyze the origin of a problem by its distribution over the urban landscape, while also guiding policymakers and the public towards a particular understanding of the spaces they mapped.
Working under Progressive-era enthusiasm for the application of science to social problems, these programs employed cartography as an ostensibly objective method of representing the ethnic, socioeconomic, or institutional contours of disadvantaged or vice-ridden areas of Chicago. An examination of these maps reveals their biases as instruments of social reform. Although the mapmakers made assumptions about their objectivity, the very act of mapping suggests a permanence of demography that was not realistic given the transience the underworld populations represented. Further, the selective mapping of buildings constituted a tool for declaring areas blighted. Considered together, the mapping programs of Stead, Hull House, and the Chicago School illustrate the way thematic mapping functioned in the context of Progressive-era social reform. By making neighborhoods legible in this way, Progressive-era mapmakers exercised the power to mark areas as intrinsically problematic and to justify a program of intervention in accordance with the goals of their reform efforts.
William T. Stead opened If Christ Came to Chicago! with a map, "Nineteenth Precinct, First Ward, Chicago, " which showed the notorious Custom House Place vice district, located between Harrison and Polk Streets in the city's most infamous ward. The district first came to Stead's attention during his 1893 visit to Chicago, when the district was at its height during the World's Columbian Exposition. 1 Stead arrived in Chicago in October 1893 eager to experience the celebration of progress and civilization of the World's Fair. However, he quickly became aware of the strong network of vice and corruption that underlaid the White City. As Carl Smith argues about this period, a pervasive tension between increasing order and destructive disorder shaped Chicago at the turn of the century to the extent that "disorder itself appeared to be one of the defi ning qualities of urban culture. " In this era:
Americans increasingly agreed that the modern American city, and Chicago in particular, was the disorderly embodiment of instability, growth, and change. Th ey also agreed that it was the center of political, economic, and social power in America, and, as such, was contested ground. 3 Considered in this light, Stead's damning exposé of Chicago's vice areas emerges as one attempt to gain ground in the fi ght to steer the development of the city's character.
Necessary for the analysis of each of the three mapping projects is a consideration of the mapmakers' choices in terms of spatial and temporal representation. In accordance with the mapmakers' intentions to provoke a response in favor of reform, the spaces mapped in each project were presented to suggest that their conditions would persist over time. Interestingly, Stead acknowledged that any attempt to study a signifi cant portion of Chicago would fall short, as it would inevitably be out of date by the time the scientist published the results. He nevertheless used his map to suggest permanence by treating time and space as reciprocal elements; he believed that by limiting his scope to a single precinct, his study would illustrate truth and yield useful results. Specifically, Stead believed that he had selected a particularly useful representative area: For the purpose of this survey I have selected the nineteenth precinct of the First Ward, not because it is an average precinct, but because it presents in an aggravated form most of the evils which are palpably not in accord with the mind of Christ. If Christ came to Chicago, it is one of the last precincts into which we should care to take him. 4 While the map constituted a relatively small portion of Stead's text, it provides a useful opportunity for analysis of Stead's reform project as a whole. Its position within the book is important; it appeared on the very fi rst page of the book, before the title page, and was therefore intended to be the reader's A reader who opened Stead's book and unfolded the map was likely to respond to its coloring before all else. Stead indicated pawnbrokers, saloons, and lodging houses by black monochromatic shading, while brothels appear as solid, vivid red. Stead relies on the power of rich color to draw attention, and likely also on the association of the colors red and black with evil and danger. As a result of this targeted use of color, establishments such as restaurants and stores, presumably deemed "morally neutral, " were de-emphasized.
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"Nineteenth Precinct, First Ward, Chicago" simultaneously alarmed and soothed; the map alerted the reader to a critical moral epidemic occurring over real and identifi able space within the city, while also assuring her of its ability to be contained once visualized. And yet, text is scarce within the map and institutions were not individuated beyond broad categories. Th is created the sense of a problem that had been identifi ed yet not entirely known, leaving the reader eager to read on. Even before the beginning of the text proper, then, Stead drove the reader to read the moral problem from his map, and to absorb his moral judgement about the Custom House Place vice district, the topic with which the remainder of the book is concerned.
In contrast to the Christian moral outrage that motivated Stead, the agenda of Chicago's Hull House was informed by a secular interest in social reform. Consonant with the settlement house movement, which had been gaining ground in the United States since 1889, founder Jane Addams and the other participants in Hull House's work saw active participation in the community life of the blighted immigrant district on the city's Near West Side as the most eff ective path to reform.
In 1885, the residents of Hull House published the Maps and Papers, the results of a study of the area between Halsted and State Streets, and Polk and Twelft h Streets. Florence Kelley, a highly active social reformer and an associate of Friedrich Engels, worked as the census director for Hull House, and it was the data amassed under her direction that was used to color the maps of the district. Hull House's decision to base its mapping project on statistics is not surprising given the secular, objective current then taking hold in social reform. By the end of the nineteenth century, the parameters and methodologies of the discipline of sociology had begun to form, as evidenced by the founding of the fi rst academic department of sociology at the University of Chicago in 1892. Th e notion of public health had come to be defi ned largely in terms of norms and deviation, as made possible by a new analytical tool: statistics. Th e Hull House, as a liberal institution with an interest in reform, was determined to assist disadvantaged populations by means of "well-modulated interventions. " 6 Th e desire to improve conditions by intervention drove reformers to "think in terms of a total and unifi ed entity that connected population with its territory, " a framework for studying human populations that led Hull House thinkers to seek out relationships between urban residents and the physical environment they inhabited.
In this sense, the Hull House maps inherited the cartographic and analytical traditions established by three earlier types of thematic cartography: the Sanborn insurance map, the disease map, and earlier maps of socioeconomic conditions. Susan Schulten has pointed out the connection between Sanborn maps and maps of urban problem areas. 7 Responding to the rapid pace of urbanization as well as the all-too-frequent occurrence of urban fi res, the Sanborn Map Company began to produce series of immensely detailed maps. Because they were insurance maps, they showed the physical and institutional composition of cities at the level of individual buildings. Similarly, maps of epidemic disease and poverty, such as John Snow's 1854 map of a London cholera outbreak and Charles Booth's color-coded map of relative socioeconomic class in London, employ a high level of detail for an analytical purpose: by mapping individual cases or households over urban space, they could determine how each unit contributed to an existing condition. Th is was the same analytical purpose that motivated the Hull House maps.
It is clear from the accompanying text that Booth's map had an especially signifi cant infl uence on Hull House's mapping program. In the preface, it was noted that "the colors in Charles Booth's wage maps of London have been retained, " suggesting both approval of Booth's research methods and some overlap between the audiences of the two maps. 8 Th e Hull House mapmakers considered their own work an improvement on his, however. Like Stead, the Hull House researchers thought it advantageous that the area surveyed and analyzed was relatively compact, and in comparison to Booth's map, "the greater minuteness of this survey will enChicago's South Side by Samuel Sewell Greeley (1895) Source: Mapping the Nation title it to a rank of its own, both as a photographic reproduction of Chicago's poorest quarters… and as an illustration of a method of research. " 9 In addition to aiding in the establishment of quantitative research methods in the study of populations, the researchers were confident that the visualization of their data would convince viewers of the fidelity of its representation.
The stated goals of the program were explicitly reformist:
The possibility of helping toward an improvement in the sanitation of the neighborhood, and toward an introduction of some degree of comfort, has given purpose and confidence to this undertaking…. Hull-House offers these facts… with the hope of stimulating inquiry and action. 10 Knowing that Hull House intentionally mapped a small area in order to encourage reform, it is useful to examine the rhetorical interactions between maps and text. In contrast with Stead's book, the wages and ethnicities maps appear several pages into the text proper, and therefore the reader's introduction to the conditions of Near West Side residents was intended to be verbal. Interestingly, the opening of the text is perhaps best described as a verbal map. Its tone recalls Jacob Riis's 1890 How the Other Half Lives or other works of muckraking journalism that would have remained in recent memory at the time of the publication of the Maps and Papers. After stating the borders of the area under examination, Agnes Sinclair Holbrook's narration omnisciently guided the reader through the district, gradually revealing the hardships of its residents and laborers. This descriptive mode also established the authority of Hull House. Holbrook included descriptions of factory life only visible from the back door, suggesting a unique level of knowledge the area and its squalid conditions that introduced the maps as the products of long-established experts.
Just as maps of epidemic disease aimed to identify each part of a larger phenomenon, the Hull House researchers parsed the residential buildings of the Near West Side to include each constituent nationality. Holbrook noted that in the nationalities map the individual was treated as the unit, such that the residence of even a single person in a building, which occurred frequently with the prevalence of boarding, warranted his or her nationality's inclusion on the map. In many cases, this convention led to the inclusion of as many as six types of shading in a single building. Thus, by electing to exclude population density from the map, the mapmakers guided the viewer to a perception of overcrowding more likely to generate sympathy and moral outrage. And, although Holbrook acknowledged that the population was frequently transient, institutions still treated the map as documentation of a condition that would persist in spite of the movements of individuals.
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Similarly, Nels Anderson's The Hobo: The Sociology of the Homeless Man opened with a preface by editor and fellow member of the University of Chicago Sociology Department Robert E. Park. In the preface, Park states the imperative for Anderson's study of the area known as Hobohemia: "A changing population of from 30,000 to 75,000 homeless men in Chicago, living together within the area of thirty or forty city blocks, has created a milieu in which new and unusual personal types flourish and new and unsuspected problems have arisen. " 12 This analysis thus established the 'hobo problem' as a uniquely contemporary phenomenon brought about by the unprecedented growth of cities. The issue of greatest concern to the researchers was the possibility within a large urban center for antisocial figures to be outcasts from the larger community, living without its regulating or moral influences, while simultaneously forming their own self-sustaining communities on different terms. 13 Elaborating further, the Committee's Preface states, "the object of this inquiry… was to secure those facts which would enable social agencies to deal intelligently with the problems created by the continuous ebb and flow, out of and into Chicago, of tens of thousands of foot-loose and homeless men. " 14 The Committee's Preface corroborated Park in locating the problem and their cause for concern in the deviant lifestyle and pattern of movement of Chicago's hobo population. The preface also identified the ultimate aim of the program. Much like Stead's and Hull House's, Anderson's study was intended to inform reform agencies of the contours and gravity of the problem and the corresponding need to intervene. Through a combination of text and mapping, Anderson advanced those aims by presenting the hobo as a social type with certain negative qualities and tendencies that were inherently problematic for himself and for society. Th e student edition of this volume opened with a reference to Auguste Comte, a French philosopher who was among the fi rst to elaborate the terms of the discipline in the 1830s, six decades before its initiation into American academia in 1892. Comte stated of sociology, "its practical aim was to establish government on the secure foundation of an exact science. " 15 Evaluating this claim in the 1920s, Park and Burgess wrote that the discipline had indeed followed this trajectory to a signifi cant extent. However, beginning in that decade, the Chicago School's work began to shift away from Comte's notion of "scientifi c prevision" and toward "a view of human communities and social relations as built 'on top of ' ecological landscapes and thus not subject to the same inexorable laws as plant and animal ecological systems. " 16 Signifi cant yet under-acknowledged contributors to the development of the Chicago School of Sociology were Jane Addams and, as a result, Hull House. While the University of Chicago began as an academically nontraditional institution, a subsequent conservative turn soon left the sociology profession strictly gender-separated. While male faculty received the title of sociologist and contributed to the academic studies that constituted the early professionalization of the discipline, women were denied access and relegated to social work, considered the non-academic and less critical branch of the fi eld, essentially an outgrowth of the traditional women's sphere. Gender segregation in sociology continued into the interwar period, when Anderson published Th e Hobo.
At that time, Progressivism, which had spurred the settlement house movement, fell out of favor due to its association with various radicalisms. 17 For that reason, although Burgess claimed that Hull-House Maps and Papers marked the foundation of urban studies in Chicago, much of Addams's infl uence on sociology was fi ltered through the work of her male colleagues and went largely unacknowledged. Nevertheless, in revisionist accounts of the development of sociology, the cartographic methodology of Hull House's Near West Side mapping program is recognized as a vital contribution to the work of the Chicago School in the 1920s and '30s.
An examination of the cartographic and verbal portions of Anderson's study reveals similar rhetorical strategies. Both components of the text delineate a geographical area, the Main Stem on Chicago's West Madison Street, aft er imbuing it with a set of problematic characteristics. Th e Progressive reform goals of the study are presented to neatly correspond to these problems. In the text directly before the map in the 1961 edition of Th e Hobo, Anderson claims that the segregation of the transient community into the small area of Hobohemia is precisely the cause of its problems:
Th e segregation of tens of thousands of footloose, homeless, and not to say hopeless men is the fact fundamental to an understanding of the problem… Th is massing of detached and migratory men upon a small area has created an environment in which gamblers, dope venders, bootleggers, and pickpockets can live and thrive. 18 Immediately following this statement is the map. Just as the text condemns the Main Stem by naming several character types universally understood to be immoral or dangerous, the eleven categories of establishments-including cheap hotels, gambling, and saloons-act as signifi ers of seediness and moral transgression.
Unlike the maps in both Stead's and Hull House's mapping programs, "Hobo Institutions On One Street Along 'Main Stem'" does not label building addresses or include the makeup of the entire city blocks; rather, it is focused exclusively on the buildings that face West Madison Street. Despite its presence in a sociological study, these elements demonstrate that the map was intended less to provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the constituent parts of the main stem neighborhood than it was intended to collapse its complexity and portray a single dimension of the districtnamely, the predominance of institutions that support the problematic transient population. Th us, by limiting the cartographic portion of his study to a single, reductionist view of Hobohemia, Anderson aimed to generate concern and make social reformers see intervention as the best response.
Each of these three maps is perhaps best understood as an effort to represent for an outside audience the conditions of the American city at the turn of the century, an era that brought new possibilities for living in the city, but also a time when urban development in laboring-class areas tended to outpace planning for the welfare of its residents. Under these conditions, the projects of mapmakers shaped the representations of the areas of Chicago they studied in order to impress upon the reader the need for reform. Carl Smith's assertion about the rhetorical power of urban catastrophes in the late nineteenth century applies nicely to these efforts to map urban conditions. He argues: Defining whether and in what way this or that event was disorderly, disastrous, and potentially catastrophic was an act of power in a struggle in which different people tried to enforce their often disputed vision of urban order as the one that was most normal, proper, desirable, progressive, and correct. The struggle was over the future of America, with which the rise of the city was so closely linked. 19 The role of cartography in this struggle to encourage reform projects is also historically specific. The act of mapping was then most often understood as a neat and objective means of reflecting real spaces and conditions. By treating maps as representations outside the bounds of subjectivity therefore capable of faithfully reflecting the world, these mapmakers were able to employ visual texts in novel ways. relationships between key characters and the past as infl uencing their politics, weighing upon their consciences, and determining their dreams for the future; in each case, however, a tension between "the shadow of the past" and "development" arises. Th e arguments and attitudes voiced by characters in Look Back, Shantytown Kid, and Love Th y Neighbor are representative of post-war British, French, and Yugoslav citizens, respectively, and discussing this dissonance between "looking back" and "moving forward" greatly implicates post-45 Europeans' national attitudes.
Rachel Schastok
In Look Back in Anger, John Osborne characterizes two societal trends of post-war England by glimpsing into the homelife of Jimmy Porter, the anti-hero who was "born out of his time. " 3 First, Osborne increasingly criticizes a nation whose majority was attempting to socially, morally, materially, and politically "develop" by jettisoning British traditions and values, such as colonialism, nobility, and conservatism. In the exposition, Jimmy drawls, "It's pretty dreary living in the American Age-unless you're an American of course, " subtly indicting the British who were futilely attempting to regain empire by emulating the progressive methods of America. 4 More explicitly, Jimmy later exclaims, "Reason and Progress, the old fi rm, is selling out!" foreseeing a "Big Crash" in those "forgotten shares… in the old traditions, the old beliefs. 5 Britain, with its conservative roots, had been usurped in the global order by the United States, and the nation was striving to "develop" in line with the American posture instead of with respect to past British actions. Osborne perhaps best personifi es Britain's abandonment of its history and traditions through Jimmy's friend, Hugh. Hugh is one of these post-45 lemmings who felt "England was fi nished for us, anyway" and that the "only real hope was to get out, and try somewhere else. " Jimmy considered this "giving up" as detestable because Hugh was leaving "his mother all on her own, " where Hugh's mother symbolizes the old English order. 6 Th rough Jimmy and Hugh, Osborne thus contemplates the degree of cowardice associated with throwing past actions, traditions, and predispositions overboard in hopes of making room for the British on the ship of American prosperity.
Opposite of the individuals who shunned British history in the name of "development" were those who were wistfully looking back to days of England's imperial glory instead of confronting the "developing" world around them. Th us, Osborne's second critique is one of those individuals who effectively lived in the shadow of the past, "casting well-fed glances back to the Edwardian twilight from [the] comfortable, disenfranchised wilderness" that was the new order of American political, economic, and cultural hegemony. 7 If Hugh embodies the British who had forsaken the past with hopes of succeeding in the new order, then Jimmy's fatherin-law, Colonel Redfern, represents those who "spend their time mostly looking forward to the past. " 8 Th e England that the Colonel "remembered was the one that [he] left in 1914, and [he] was happy to go on remembering it that way. " Th e Colonel mourns for the lost dream of imperial glory, lamenting, "If only it could have gone on forever… I think the last day the sun shone was when that dirty little train steamed out of that crowded, suff ocating Indian station… I knew in my heart it was all over then. Everything. " 9 Faced with the uncertainty of living in an era dominated-materially, politically, and socially-by another nation and absent of "any good, brave causes" for which one would die, many chose to freeze time, mentally occupying the age of British opulence and power instead of confronting the reality of the post-45 global dynamic. 10 Th us, Osborne displays an England torn between those "hurt because everything is changed" and those "hurt because everything is the same. "
11 Some are living in the "shadow of the past" while feeling victimized by the "developments" of the present, and others are consciously avoiding the "shadow of the past" in a ruthless attempt for "development. " Classifying post-45 Britain as "developing in the shadow of the past, " therefore, glosses over the intricacies that made British society as tense as it was in the 1950s. Azouz Begag, in his memoir Shantytown Kid, depicts a similar strain in a France that had reverted from allowing the "free circulation" of Algerians and French to a state of blatant discrimination resulting in Algerian shame of identity, where the condition of "free circulation" is like the past, and the state of discrimination occurs in the present. 12 Here, Algerians are distancing themselves from their heritage with hopes of growing alongside the French. One observes the institutionalized pressure to assimilate through Begag's experience in the French school system. Begag "wanted to be among the top of the class alongside the French children, " a surprising goal, considering that Begag's fellow Arab schoolchildren consistently occupied the bottom ranks of classroom performance and that he was oft en forced to decide between succeeding in class and maintaining friendships with his shantytown peers. 13 On a larger scale, the pattern of fl eeing from one's Algerian heritage in order to better assimilate into national French culture is visible in the gradual emigration of inhabitants of Le Chaâba, the shantytown, to apartments in French cities, specifi cally Lyon. Describing the Algerians' wishes to sever ties with the shantytown and with their past in order to "develop" on French terms, Begag writes, "A lot of people started thinking about leaving. Where to? Anywhere, " and the trend continued until it felt as though "Le Chaâba's soul was slipping away through the cracks in the planks. " Yet, as Algerians attempted to find their place in French society, the French began to relapse into racial discrimination, forgoing the possibility for social "development" in order to rest within the comfortable confines of the antiquated social order that they had once dominated. When Begag and his friends, upon the request of the piously Arabic Old Ma Louise, began pelting a prostitute and her client who had parked on the outskirts of Le Chaâba, the Frenchman yelled, "You bunch of dune coons! Do you think I'm going to let you Arabs start laying down the law in our own country?" before running away. 15 The expression "our own country" summarizes the newly heightened national French perception of French-Algerian relations: although the French had agreed to the "free circulation" of Algerians in the Evian Accords, Algerians were increasingly regarded as unwelcome guests in French territory. Adding to evidence of this perception, Begag concludes the memoir of his childhood by recalling the question of his family's French landlord: "So when are you going back to your country?" 16 Begag characterizes French nationals as reverting to the "shadow of [their] past" and ignoring previous developments toward social equality, while he shows how Algerians progressively shied away from their traditions, heritage, and history in hopes of "developing" alongside the native French. Just as in Look Back in Anger, Shantytown Kid demonstrates the historical complexities that are ignored by simply agreeing that all post-45 European nations, here France and its old colony Algeria, developed in the shadow of the past.
The implications of this pattern culminated in the Bosnian War, chronicled by Peter Maass in Love Thy Neighbor. In this iteration, it is the Serbs who march deep into the shadow of their past, resurrecting nationalist images of Prince Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo Polje and calling upon Serbs to avenge their ancestors who had been subjugated by Muslims and their parents who had been murdered by Croatians of the Ustashe, undoing Tito's actions toward creating a unified Slavic people. Demonstrating the Serbian obsession with the past, Maass notes the "vulgar justice… that a man who was born in a concentration camp ended up ruling his own string of camps as an adult. " 17 A Bosnian (ex-)veterinarian conveyed to Maass the confusion and, ultimately, horror resulting from the transformation of Serbian classmates, friends, and neighbors complacent in the development of Slavic unity under Tito into looters, rapists, and murderers: "We didn't believe that this would happen. This is the twentieth century. We are in Europe. We have satellite television here. Even today, when there is electricity, we can watch CNN. We can watch reports of our own genocide!" 18 Those who chose to mourn for imperial England instead of contribute to the presence of Britain inspired societal and generational divides, and the French who reneged on the offer of "free circulation" of Algerians fostered the growth of racial discrimination. The consequence of Serbs investing in nationalism and accepting Tito's death as an opportunity to dominate the Balkans in the name of "revenge" was the largest instance of European genocide since the Holocaust.
Meanwhile, the United States and the powers of Western Europe attempted to evade the mistakes of the past by avoiding the lessons of history entirely. Maass lists "ethnic rivalry, " "tribal warfare, " and the characterization of Slavs as "uncivilized" as the dominant European justifications for why the Balkans were hastily unraveling; these rationalizations were crucial because they "defined the violence as an antimodern and anti-Western phenomenon-an exception. " 19 However, these excuses also prevented Europeans from using their experiences with genocide and fractious European relations to intervene: instead of "guns or ammunition, " America and Western Europe airdropped "feta cheese and pasta. " 20 These actions were met with some criticism. For example, Margaret Thatcher, who left office just before the Balkans erupted, felt that "Feeding or evacuating the victims rather than helping them resist aggression makes us accomplices. " She expressed shame in "the European Community, for this is happening in the heart of Europe. It is within Europe's sphere of influence.
It should be within Europe's sphere of conscience. There is no conscience. " 21 On the whole, however, diplomats from Western Europe treated the Bosnian War as though they had never encountered such a conflict. But "[the] Redmans, " Maass speculates, "knew precisely what was going on… they had studied Munich and 1938 , and yet they nonetheless participated in the destruction of a European nation and a European people, even though disobedience would have meant nothing more severe than the loss of their job. " 22 Paradoxically, by tiptoeing around the siege of the city where Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, by chalking the conflict up to "ethnic rivalry" rather than exaggerated nationalism and absurd bids for Balkan power, by refusing to intervene for fear of proceeding down the same paths that led to the World Wars, by appeasing the Serbs and denying justice to the Bosnians, the powers of Western Europe allowed the past to repeat itself. In their attempts to "develop" a mature response to a European war, these powers ignored entirely "Discussing this dissonance between 'looking back' and 'moving forward' greatly implicates post-45 Europeans' national attitudes."
Caley Caito the lessons of the past in a failure of historical consciousness. Th us, while the Serbs regressed into the depths of their past (c. 1389) and shunned the recent unifying developments that had been made in Yugoslavia, other post-45 European countries acted reciprocally by distancing themselves from the shadow of the past in hopes of "developing" a confl ictfree solution to the decimation of a nation.
In 1985, Richard von Weizsäcker made the distinction that while "[Th e] young people are not responsible for what happened over 40 years ago… they are responsible for the historical consequences. " 23 Less than a decade later, those young people were operating concentration camps, comprising fi ring squads, gang-raping women and children, digging mass graves, and exacting a reign of terror in Bosnia. One might argue that the statement "Post-45 European countries developed in the shadow of the past" is suffi cient to capture the essence of European actions aft er 1945. However, England, France, and Yugoslavia can be sorted into two contingencies-one of people avoiding the past in hopes of accelerating present development and the other of people embracing inertia and the shadow of their past, evading present developments. Exploring this dichotomy, rather than embracing the umbrella statement, allows for a greater understanding of the societal gaps that served as a place for confl ict to fester and grow in postwar Europe.
Norwegian UN troops on "Sniper Alley" in Sarajevo (1995) Source: Paalso (Wikimedia Commons) 
